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Abstract 
In Australia the pace of labour market deregulation has rapidly accelerated over 
the 1990s.  This paper uses the recent developments in the Australian labour 
market to provide further insight into the effects of deregulatory policies on labour 
markets and labour. Does labour market deregulation have an equivalent impact 
on different labour market groups? Two wage indicators (the gender pay gap and 
the wage differential between part-time and full-time workers) are used to answer 
these questions.  The paper shows that over the first half of the 1990s there was 
no change in the gender wage gap in the full-time labour market (equal to 10.5 
per cent), a 12.6 percentage point convergence in the gender wage gap in the 
part-time labour market, and a 3.4 percentage point convergence in the part-
time/full-time wage gap.  Changes in the part-time labour market may be 
attributed to a deterioration in the relative earnings of males employed part-time. 
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DEREGULATION AND RELATIVE WAGES: 





Over the last few decades there has been a worldwide shift in values and attitudes 
towards markets and institutions.  It is a shift characterized by a greater acceptance of 
economic rationalism and a laissez-faire approach to government. In the labour market it 
is reflected in legislative reforms designed to decentralize pay determination and 
deregulate the employment relationship. The claimed macro-economic benefits 
associated with such economic policy shifts include enhanced productivity, employment 
growth and lower inflation stemming from reduced spillover-effects or wage flow-ons.   
 
While the net effects of the reforms appear to be gender neutral, beyond the aggregate 
statistics significant differences are apparent.  In Britain, for example, women in the full-
time labour market have managed to move into a broader set of occupations, improve 
their relative skill levels and reduce the gender wage gap (Makepeace et al. 1999; 
Bruegel and Perrons 1998; Colling and Dickens, 1998).1 These gains must, however, be 
considered against a growth in low paid, part-time, insecure employment and a parallel 
increase in wage polarization (Brukitt, O’Donnell, Patel 1999; Bruegel and Perrons, 
1998; Burchell, 1999; Leslie and Pu, 1996). 
 
Some have attributed the mixed UK outcomes to the “…contradictory stance of 
Conservative thinking vis-à-vis individual enterprise, market process and familial 
ideology” (Bruegel and Perrons, 1998: 104-105). The various deregulatory policies 
adopted have narrowed access to employment protection rights, weakened trade unions, 
abolished wage councils (important for the regulation of wages in many low paid 
(female) industries), privatized public sector employment, decentralized wage bargaining 
to the enterprise level and/or individual level, established employer prerogative and 
undermined the provisions in equality legislation (Bruegel and Perrons 1998; Colling and 
Dickens, 1998). Deregulation has also fostered a change in working time arrangements 
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and a shift towards part-time and other non-standard forms of employment (Fajertag, 
1999; Bosch, 1999) 
 
Relative to the UK Australia has been slow to embrace the neo-liberalist deregulatory 
agenda, although since the early 1990s the pace of reform has quickened. Indeed, 
international comparative analysis suggests that Australia may now be classified as a 
‘radical example of direct labour market deregulation’ (Campbell and Brosnan, 1999).  
Many parallels with the UK experience are apparent. The award system (analogous to the 
wage councils) has been dismantled, trade union power and rights have been weakened, 
public sector utilities have been privatized, and employer prerogative asserted.  Available 
research suggests that over the 1990s there has been no significant change in the gender 
wage gap in the full-time labour market, while the relative position of part-timers appears 
to be worsening (Wooden, 1997). In 1990 the part-time/full-time wage gap for non-
managerial employees was 6 per cent. By 1998 it had more than doubled to 15 per cent 
(Whitehouse, 2000). Growing wage polarization now features as a characteristic of the 
Australian labour market (Borland, 1999; Buchanan, Callus and Briggs, 1999; ABS 
2000) 
 
At an empirical level, the recent developments in the Australian labour market offer yet 
another opportunity to examine the effects of deregulatory policies on labour markets and 
labour. In the analysis below Australian data for 1990 and 1996 are employed to further 
explore the impact of deregulatory policies on labour market participants. Does labour 
market deregulation have an equivalent impact on the wages of different labour market 
groups? Evidence from the US, for example, suggests that deunionisation had a greater 
impact on the wage relativities of low and middle skill groups than it did on high skill 
groups (Blau and Kahn, 1997) 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the main contours 
of change in the Australian system; Section 3 offers some descriptive information on the 
Australian labour market; Section 4 describes the data and research methodology; Section 




2: Labour Market Deregulation in Australia2 
 
Throughout most of the last century wages and conditions of employment within 
Australia were primarily regulated by a system of legally binding awards that had been 
arbitrated or certified by independent industrial tribunals.  Award regulation occurred at 
both federal and state levels, although state tribunals generally followed the federal 
tribunal in their determinations. The coverage of the award system (around 80 per cent of 
employees) was extensive and the principle of comparative wage justice (alternatively 
known as ‘fair wage comparisons’) ensured a well-integrated system. Gains won in one 
sector generally flowed through with relative uniformity to another.  
 
There were, however, gaps in the award system. Non-employees (e.g. cleaners employed 
in private households), executives and some managerial employees were outside the 
system and instead subject to (common law) individual contracts; award enforcement was 
poor, creating space for avoidance and evasion; and the provisions in awards were 
primarily relevant to a permanent, full-time, waged workforce.  There were some 
additional clauses for other employment categories (e.g. casual, part-time work) but the 
clauses were residual and were essentially designed to limit the extent of non-standard 
forms of employment (Campbell and Brosnan, 1999).  
 
Notwithstanding the above gaps, various assessments of the Australian award system 
suggest that it served Australia well. For example, the adoption of the 1969 principle of 
Equal Pay for Equal Work and the 1972 principle of Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value 
by the federal tribunal was instrumental in removing institutionalized pay discrimination 
and delivering rapid convergence in the gender pay gap (Gregory and Duncan 1981). 
 
For much of the post-war period the gaps noted above were inconsequential and were not 
used by employers to bid down wages and conditions. However, as labour market 
conditions changed employers increasingly made use of the award system to reduce 
labour costs. The significant growth in casual employment is symptomatic of this; with 
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employers using the category of casual employment to avoid paying annual leave, sick 
leave, parental leave, long-service leave and redundancy payments. The special 
provisions for casual employees in awards failed to provide protection and “… in effect, 
operated as a licence to employers to deprive a section of their workforce of most 
standard rights and benefits” (Campbell and Brosnan, 1999: 358). The provisions instead 
helped spur the growth of casual employment in Australia bringing about a “… sharp 
dualistic division in the employment structure” (ibid.: 361).3  
 
Although the awards provided a fair degree of flexibility, criticism of the system 
mounted. As support for the neo-liberalist agenda grew so did calls for product and 
labour market deregulation. In 1987, in an effort to appease those pushing for change the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) introduced a two-tier wage 
providing for both national wage adjustments and productivity bargaining. In October 
1991, under increasing pressure to further decentralize wage bargaining the AIRC 
‘begrudgingly’ introduced enterprise bargaining (Dabscheck 1997).  This did little to 
appease the key players (notably the Australian Labor Party (ALP), the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Business Council of Australia (BCA)) who had 
a common objective of overturning the traditional system of arbitration (Hancock, 1999).  
Accordingly, in 1992 the ALP amended the Industrial Relations Act 1988 and introduced 
a new division (3A) on certified agreements. Following re-election more substantial 
changes were made with the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993, which came into 
effect in early 1994. Under this Act collective bargaining was given priority and awards 
were relegated to the role of ‘safety net’. Awards thus became the benchmark against 
which the no-disadvantage test was conducted and the main source of wage adjustments 
for those not in the enterprise stream.  
 
Although the 1993 reforms were depicted as an extension of over-award bargaining, 
closer inspection suggests that they delivered a critical ‘shift in the power relations’ 
between employers and employees (Campbell and Brosnan, 1999: 365). Aside from 
reducing the attractiveness of the award system (by constraining award or safety net wage 
adjustments to be substantially less than those awarded in the bargaining stream), the 
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reforms also introduced a new stream of agreements (non-union collective agreements), 
curbed union power and placed limitations on ‘protected industrial action’. The latter was 
provided for, but only with respect to the pursuit of single-employer agreements. A prime 
intent of the legislation was the imposition of single-employer bargaining as the dominant 
mechanism for wage determination (Buchanan, Callus and Briggs, 1999). The result was 
a decline in multi-employer bargaining and an exacerbation in the trend towards 
fragmentation.   
 
In March 1996 the ALP lost power to the Howard Coalition government. Building on the 
1993 reforms, new legislation in the form of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 
introduced further regulatory reforms aimed at curbing union influence, promoting 
single-employer and individual bargaining and establishing managerial prerogatives 
(ibid.).  The award stream was maintained, but further paired back to a set of  ‘allowable 
matters’, the option for non-union collective agreements were improved and a new form 
of agreements – individual  contracts (or Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs))  
introduced. The 1996 Act continued to impose restrictions on multi-employer bargaining 
by trade unions, tightened the sanctions on industrial action and introduced new 
restrictions on trade unions (e.g. on rights of coverage). Enforcement has been weakened 
and secrecy provisions now apply to some agreements (e.g. AWAs). As with the 
Thatcher government during the miner’s strike, the Howard government has backed 
aggressive employer strategies (e.g. the 1998 waterfront dispute) designed to weaken 
trade union power.  
 
Whilst the reforms at the federal level appear to be far reaching, reforms at the State level 
have, in some cases, been even more radical (Teicher and Svensen, 1998). The West 
Australian government, for example, considers itself as a ‘pacesetter’ in the field of 
labour market reform (Second Reading Speech, Assembly, 8/7/93: 1456-1459).  Radical 
labour market reforms have similarly been introduced in Victoria.  In New South Wales 
the changes have retained a more collectivist focus. Non-union bargaining, for example, 




Notwithstanding the ‘carrot and stick’ approach to decentralised wage bargaining, the up-
take of enterprise and individual agreements has remained relatively low.  Estimates from 
a recent survey of agreement coverage suggest that only 42 per cent of employees in the 
survey had their pay determined through registered enterprise agreements (see Table 1). 
A further 44 per cent of employees remained in the residual, run-down, award stream (22 
per cent covered by awards only; and 22 per cent enjoying awards plus overaward 
bargaining). The remaining 14 per cent of the survey sample were covered by other pay 
arrangements (e.g. individual contracts).5 
 
Table 1: Coverage of Agreements (% employees), 1999 










Full-time employees 13 27 44 17 
Part-time employees 44 12 38 6 
All employees 22 22 42 14 
Source: DEWRSB (2000), Table 3 
 
Whilst the statistics in Table 1 are of considerable interest, it is argued that a focus on the 
up-take of enterprise agreements misses a significant feature of the change since 1991 -  
the atrophy of award regulation (Campbell and Brosnan 1999, p.368) and the resultant 
inequities generated by the new arrangements.  With this in mind, the remainder of this 
paper examines the impact of labour market deregulation on different labour market 
groups.  Earnings feature as the principal indicator of change. The focus is directed at two 
sets of wage relativities: the gender wage gap and the full-time/part-time wage gap.  
Before proceeding to the results section the following discussion offers background 
information on some pertinent features of the changing Australian labour market. 
 
 
3: The Changing Australian Labour Market 
 
This section provides background information on some key labour market developments  
since 1990. (In most instances the reference period is June 1990 to June 2000). Attention 
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is restricted to a limited set of indicators, specifically: employment, participation and 
work patterns; wages, bargaining and trade union membership. 
 
 
Employment, Participation and Work Patterns 
 
Over the 1990s Australia recorded relatively strong employment growth. Across all 
persons the number of jobs increased by 14.5 per cent, although this largely comprised a 
growth in part-time employment (equal to 41 per cent). Full-time employment grew by 
only 7.5 per cent (Figure 1) in the decade to June 2000. Notwithstanding the favourable 
employment performance, the job growth did little to affect the rate of unemployment. 
Over the same period there was no change in the male unemployment rate (currently 6.4 
per cent) and an insignificant fall in the female unemployment rate (from 6.9 per cent to 
6.2 per cent). These ratios should be considered against a significant  increase in the 
female participation rate (from 52 to 55 per cent) and a significant decrease in the male 














Source: ABS Cat. 6203




As with most developed economies, there is a high degree of gender segmentation in the 
labour market, not only with respect to occupation, but also employment status. For 
example, although females currently make up around 44 per cent of the total Australian 
labour force, only 57 per cent are employed full-time; the corresponding share of full-
time employment amongst males is 88 per cent.  Females are, therefore, significantly 
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over-represented in the part-time labour market; women hold 73 per cent of part-time 
jobs.6 
 
Part-time employment amongst males is, however, on the rise. Over the decade to June 
2000 the level of male part-time employment grew by 71 per cent (or from 4.6 per cent to 
6.9 per cent of total employment in Australia).  Amongst females the number in part-time 
employment increased by 32 per cent (or from 16.5 to 18.4 per cent of total employment) 
over the same period. Between 1990 and 2000 males moved into 39 per cent of all new 
part-time jobs and 42 per cent of all new full-time jobs.  The majority (60 per cent) of all 















Source: ABS Cat. 6203






An important feature of the employment growth over the decade was that it was primarily 
concentrated in the casual labour market. For example, between 1990 and 1996 male 
casual employment grew by 343,000, while total male employment increased by less than 
half this figure (118,900).  Between 1990 and 1998, 90 per cent of total male employment 
growth was of a casual nature.  Amongst females the corresponding share was 37 per cent 




Table 2: Casual Employment Growth, 1990 to 1998 
  1990 1996 1998 1990/96 1990/98 1990/96 1990/98 
  ‘000 change  '000 share of total employment 
growth, by sex (%) 
Males   
  Full-Time-casual 266 401 453 135 187 114 41 
  Part-Time-casual 220 428 441 208 221 175 49 
  Total Male Casual Jobs 486 829 894 343 408 288 90 
  Total All Male Jobs 4624 4742 5078 118.9 455   
Females   
Full-Time-casual 118 158 164 40 46 13 7 
Part-Time-casual 678 854 888 176 210 56 30 
Total Female Casual Jobs 796 1012 1052 216 256 68 37 
Total All Female Jobs 3275 3591 3964 316 689   
Source: Junor (1998), Table 1 and ABS unpublished data. 
 
Given the substantial change in male and female employment patterns, it is important to 
ask whether or not the shifts were evenly distributed within each gender group. Evidence 
provided in Figures 3 and 4 show that differences were apparent. In the male labour 
market part-time employment growth was primarily concentrated in the 25-54 year old 
age group. Amongst females the growth occurred amongst young women (aged 15-24) 
and older women (aged 45 plus).  
 



































The strong growth in part-time employment, together with the emerging literature 
highlighting the increasing share of persons working very long hours (e.g. Dawkins 
1996), suggests another question: how evenly is the paid work distributed?  Figures 5 and 
6, for males and females respectively, again show important gender differences.9  
 
Amongst males there has been an increase in the incidence of ‘long hours’ (48+) and 
‘short hours’ (1-15), and a decline in standard hours (30-44).  Females, similarly, have 
experienced a decline in standard hours.  There has been no change in ‘short hours’ and a 
substantial rise in ‘long hours’. For example, in between June 1990 and June 2000, the 
number of females working 45 or more hours per week increased by 53 per cent; amongst 
males the corresponding increase was 26 per cent.  At the other end of the spectrum, the 
number of males working between 1 and 29 hours per week increased by 29 per cent; 
amongst females the corresponding growth rate was 25 per cent.10 
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Wages, Bargaining and Trade Union Membership 
 
Earlier in the paper we learned that labour market deregulation had affected the power of 
trade unions, fragmented bargaining structures and had contributed to rising wage 
inequality. In this sub-section some basic statistical facts are provided to illustrate these 
trends. 
 
Table 3 below shows that over the 1990s there was a dramatic decline in the trade union 
membership rate. In 1992 40 per cent of all employees were trade union members, by 
1999 the share had declined by more than one third to 26 per cent.  Although the 
membership rates of men are higher than women, it is apparent that the shares are 
converging.  In 1999 the membership rate for women was equal to 23 per cent, and 28 
per cent for men.  Many structural changes, such as the strong growth in casual and part-
time employment, can explain the changing union membership rates observed here.  In 
1999, for example, the union membership rate amongst casual employees was 11 per 
cent. Amongst all permanent employees the corresponding rate was 31 per cent (ABS 
2000, p.137). Other structural factors affecting membership rates include: a decline in 
public sector employment, growth of industries where union density is low, reductions in 





Table 3: Trade Union Membership (%), 1992 and 1999 
 1992 1999 %-Point Change 
Males 43.4 27.7 -15.7 
Females 34.8 23.4 -11.4 
Persons 39.6 25.7 -13.9 
Source: ABS (2000), p.135. 
 
The decline in trade union membership has, in turn, contributed to rising wage inequality 
in Australia, particularly for men (Borland 1996). The following table (Table 4) shows 
that, although the trend towards rising inequality was evident in the 1980s labour market 
developments in the 1990s have only exacerbated the trend.  In 1991 low paid full-time 
adult employees (10th percentile) earned 69 per cent of those in the middle of the earnings 
distribution (i.e. the P10/P50 ratio); by 1998 the ratio had declined 4 percentage points to 
65 per cent. The pattern of rising wage inequality was particularly pronounced in the 
male labour market.  
 
Table 4: Earnings Distribution Ratios for Full-Time Adult Employees, 1985 to 1998 
 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 
Change 
1991-1998
 - % - %-point 
Males           
  P10/P50 70 69 66 67 65 65 65 64 62 -5 
  P90/P50 162 162 163 166 169 167 169 170 175 9 
Females           
  P10/P50 78 75 73 74 73 73 72 71 70 -4 
  P90/P50 150 150 151 154 155 154 154 153 155 1 
Persons           
  P10/P50 72 70 68 69 68 68 68 66 65 -4 
  P90/P50 163 163 162 168 166 165 167 168 172 4 
Source: ABS (2000), p.145 
 
In the full-time labour market there has been no overall net change in the wage gap 
between males and females nationally over the decade (see figure 7). By November 1999 
the female/male earnings ratio was 84.4 per cent, equal to a gap of 15.6 percentage 
points.11  Some State differences are, however, apparent. Over the 1990s South Australia 
and Western Australia both recorded significant declines in the relative earnings of 
females.  By November 1999 the gender wage gap in Western Australia was 21.4 




Figure 7: Australian and State Gender Wage Relativities, 1991 to 1999

























































































The changing structure of wage relativities, of course, reflects more than simply a decline 
in trade union membership rates.  Rising wage inequality is also a product of changing 
bargaining and employment arrangements.  Table 5, for example, shows substantial 
variation in the average weekly earnings of public and private sector employees.  In 1998 
the private/public earnings ratio for males employed full-time was 89.7 per cent; amongst 
females the corresponding ratio was 80.8 per cent.  Earnings in the public sector are, on 
average, higher and more equitably distributed.  However, over the last decade there has 
been a very large decline in public sector employment and, with it, a growth in wage 
inequality.12  
 
Table 5: Average Weekly Total Earnings Private/Public Sector Ratio, 1998 
 Males Females Persons 
 - % - 
Employed Full-Time 89.7 80.8 87.9 
Employed Part-Time 65.5 69.7 68.8 




A portion of the public/private wage differential can be attributed to differences in the 
arrangements for determining wages.  Table 6 shows that within the public sector, 76 per 
cent of all employees had their pay determined through a registered enterprise agreement; 
in the private sector the corresponding share was 29 per cent.13  Why does this matter?  It 
matters because the wage adjustments granted in the award stream (excluding overaward 
negotiations) are significantly lower than those provided in the bargaining stream. In the 
former the average annual wage adjustment is around 1.3 per cent; in the latter it is 
somewhere between 4 and 6 per cent (see Table 7). 
 
Table 6: Coverage of Agreements (% employees), by Sector, 1999 










All Private Sector 26 30 29 15 
All Public Sector 13 1 76 10 
All Employees 22 22 42 14 
Source: DEWRSB (2000), Table 2 
 
Table 7: Average Annual Wage Increase & Estimated Average Weekly Wage, by 
Agreement Type. 
 Awards only 
Registered Collective 
Agreements 
Individual Agreements & 
Other Arrangements(c) 
Estimated Average Annual 
Wage Increase(a) 1.3% 
range 
4% to 6% 
range 
0% to 8% 
Average Weekly Wage  
(full-time employees)(b) $586 $718 $990 
(a) These estimates are from ACIRRT (1999) and pertain to 1995 data. 
(b) These estimates are from DEWRSB (2000) and pertain to 1999 data. 
(c) The ‘Other Arrangements’ does not include over-award bargaining and unregistered agreements. 
 
The slow movement in award wages relative to other bargaining arrangements is also 
problematic for the part-time workforce.  Relative to full-timers, part-timers are much 
more likely to depend on the award system for their wage outcomes. (In 1999 44 per cent 
of part-time employees in organisations with 5 or more employees were paid at the award 
rate; the corresponding share for full-timers was only 13 per cent).14  
 
The following two tables from Wooden (1997) and Whitehouse (2000), respectively, 
illustrate the extent to which part-timers are disadvantaged in the current system.  
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Wooden (Table 8) shows that in the three years between 1992 and 1995 the overall wage 
gap between part-time and full-time non-managerial employees increased by 4.3 
percentage points for males, and 5.2 percentage points for females.  When all-employees 
and a longer time span are considered the deterioration in the part-time wage differential 
is even greater.  
 
Figures from Whitehouse (Table 9) demonstrate a nine percentage point widening in the 
wage gap of part-timers relative to full-time (permanent) employees.  Within the part-
time labour force there has been a three percentage point convergence in the gender pay 
gap. The result may reflect a large growth in the incidence of male, part-time casual 
employment and with it a deterioration in their relative wages. Recent research by 
Wooden (1999, p.164) finds that casual employment in Australia is now associated with a 
negative wage premium of around 6 per cent after controlling for skill and job 
characteristics. (The following section sheds further light on some of these trends).  
 
Table 8: Average Hourly Earnings of Part-Timers Relative to Average Ordinary 
Earnings of Full-Time Non-Managerial Employees. 
 Males  Females  Males Females 
 1992 1995 1992 1995 
  - % - 
%-point change 
(1992-1995) 
 Professionals 124.8 115.9 95.1 96.6 -8.9 1.5 
 Para-Professionals 87.7 86.1 106.7 99.7 -1.6 -7 
 Tradespersons 96.6 94.4 86.4 85.8 -2.2 -0.6 
 Clerks 96.4 89.4 91.5 87.1 -7 -4.4 
 Salespersons & Personal 
  Service workers 90 84.5 87.2 80.7 -5.5 -6.5 
 Plant & Machine  
  Operators & Drivers 93.5 91.4 78.9 83.7 -2.1 4.8 
 Labourers & Related  
  Workers 102.6 99.4 99.3 95.5 -3.2 -3.8 
Total 96.3 92 93.6 88.4 -4.3 -5.2 
Source: Wooden (1997), Table 3. The table can not be updated due to a change in the occupational coding 
arrangements post 1995. 
 
Table 9: Part-Time and Full-Time Relative Wage Gaps.  
 1990 
Wage Gap( %) 
1998 
Wage Gap (%) 
Change: 
%-point 
Part-Time (all) / FT (permanent) -6 -15 -9 
PT (casual) / FT (permanent) -8 -17 -9 
PT (permanent) / FT (permanent) -4 -12 -8 
Female PT/ Male PT -2 1 3 




Of course, it should be noted that the above relativities pertain to ‘raw’ or ‘unadjusted’ 
wage gaps and, in the absence of controls for differences in the characteristics of the 
groups (e.g part-time and full-time; public and private; males and females) will probably 
over-state the size of the gaps. Gornick and Jacobs (1996), for example, show that around 
one fifth of the female part-time/full-time wage gap in the Australia can be explained by 
differences in the characteristics of part-time and full-time workers. In the UK the 
explained portion is even higher, equal to 26 per cent.15   In the following section 
estimated wage equations are used to provide further insight into the effects of labour 
market deregulation on the wage structure. 
 
  
4: Data and Methodology 
 
A key factor associated with the selection of suitable data sets was the ability to make 
comparisons pre and post labour market deregulation; e.g. pre and post 1992. In this 
paper comparisons are made between data from the 1989/90 Income Distribution  Survey 
(IDS) and the merged data from the 1995/96 IDS and the 1996/97 IDS.  The two 1995/96 
and 1996/97 IDS data files were merged to produce a large enough sample for analysis 
purposes.  The earnings data in the 1996/97 IDS were deflated to 1995/96 levels.16  When 
the samples are restricted to full-time wage and salary earners aged between 16 and 64 
years there are 3,202 and 3,273 females in the 1996 and 1990 samples, respectively.17,18  
The corresponding male sample sizes are 5866 (in 1996) and 6385 (in 1990).19  The IDS 
data files also provide information on part-time workers. After purging the file of persons 
employed less than 10 hours, there were 2048 part-time employees in the 1990 sample 
and 2217 in the 1996 sample.20 (Part-time work is defined as less than 35 hours per 
week). 
 
The analytical framework is the human capital model. There are a number of ways in 
which the model may be used to study gender wage discrimination. The simplest is to 
include a female dummy variable. The level of wage disadvantage may be measured by 
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the coefficient on this control variable.  A more sophisticated approach involves the 
estimation of separate wage equations for males and females and a subsequent 
decomposition of the gap into explained and unexplained components (e.g. Blinder, 
1973; and Oaxaca, 1973).  Both approaches result in adjusted gender wage gaps of 
similar magnitudes (Miller 1994; Preston 2000 (appendix c)).   In the following analysis 
preference is given to the simplistic dummy variable approach.  As noted above, the 
Blinder/Oaxaca approach requires estimation of separate male and female wage 
equations. Disaggregation of the IDS data by full-time status, state and gender produces 
relatively small sample sizes for some groups and brings with it the possibility that the 
results may not be robust.  
 
The estimated wage equations are of the form  ββ ˆˆˆln 0 ii VY += . The dependent variable 
in all cases is a measure of hourly earning in the persons main job.21 The set of control 
variables includes measures for educational attainment, potential labour market 
experience and its square, marital status, presence and age of dependent children, migrant 
status and location of residence.22,23,24 A female dummy variable is used to measure 
female ‘treatment-disadvantage’ in the labour market. 25  
 
The analysis below focuses on two sets of relativities: the gender pay gap in the full-time 
labour market, and the wage gap between part-time and full-time employees.   The study 
concentrates, primarily, on developments at the national level although separate estimates 
of the gender wage gap are given for each State.  As previously noted, governments 
(State and Federal) throughout Australia have, over the 1990s, implemented a range of 
deregulatory policies.  Some have pursued a radical agenda based on an ideology of 
individualism (e.g. WA and Victoria), in other States (e.g. NSW) the focus has remained 
collectivist. Comparisions of outcomes between more and less deregulated States allows 
a within country study of the effects of deregulation on gender wage equality.  One 
advantage associated with this approach is that it minimises problems inherent in cross-
country cmparative studies, namely difficulties associated with controlling for the unique 
historical and social experiences of each country (Bray 1993).  A limitation with the 
methodology is that one cannot identify, from the data, the jurisdiction of coverage for 
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each individual. Within each State they may be covered by either the State jurisdiction or 
the Federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, the spread of the Federal jurisdiction is not even 
across the States. Victoria, for example, has historically had a higher incidence of Federal 






The analysis begins with a study of the gender wage gap. It was widely feared that labour 
market deregulation would disadvantage women relative to men (Wooden, 1997). 
Women, for example, tend to be concentrated in lower status jobs, have lower rates of 
unionisation and are often in a weaker bargaining position.   
 
The results reported in Table 10 show that throughout Australia females are at an 
earnings disadvantage relative to men, even after controlling for differences in their 
productivity characteristics. Nationally the adjusted gender wage gap is 10.5 per cent, 
elsewhere it is much higher.26,27 For example, in Western Australia females earn 18.5 per 
cent less than their male counterparts.  The estimates in Table 11 show that over the first 
half of the 1990s, a period of substantial labour market deregulation, there was no 
significant change in the gender wage ratio in the full-time labour market at the national 
level. The small convergence observed was not significant. This, of course, does not 
imply an absence of deregulatory effects on market wages.  It could be that the effects of 
deregulation and rising inequality have been moderated by other forces, such as 
improvements in the human capital endowments of females (Blau and Kahn 1994).  
Research reported elsewhere (e.g. Preston and Crockett 1999a) shows that, on average, 
Australia females have, as suggested here, managed to improve their qualification, skill 




Table 10: State Levels of Gender (Hourly) Wage Discrimination 
 1996 1990 
 Coef. t-stat  mean Coef. t-stat  mean 
Australia -0.105 12.544 *** 0.353 -0.113 15.580 *** 0.339 
  NSW -0.097 5.857 *** 0.365 -0.129 9.196 *** 0.343 
  VIC -0.088 5.140 *** 0.368 -0.126 7.870 *** 0.344 
  QLD -0.112 6.052 *** 0.352 -0.118 7.497 *** 0.340 
  SA -0.051 2.339 ** 0.336 -0.022 1.139  0.338 
  WA -0.185 6.911 *** 0.327 -0.133 7.170 *** 0.335 
  TAS -0.117 4.123 *** 0.338 -0.089 2.538 ** 0.309 
Notes: 
(a ) The above results detail the coefficient estimates on a ‘female dummy’ in pooled (male plus female) 
wage equations. The set of explanatory variables includes controls for education (2 dummies), experience 
and its square, marital status (2 dummies), birthplace (1 dummy), children (3 dummies) and area of 
residence (urban/rural) (1 dummy). Appendix A reports the national results.  The state results are available 
from the author on request. 
( b) Absolute t-statistics are reported; *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level  
( c) The ‘mean’ proportions indicate the proportions of female in each sample group. 
(d) The Australian results detailed are for the six states taken as a whole. Persons in the Northern Territory 
and Australian Capital Territory are not included in this study.  
 
Table 11: Movements in Australian Gender Wage Gaps: 1990 to 1996 
 Change in the Gender Wage Gap t-statistic 
 
 
Australia 0.009 0.817  
  NSW 0.037 1.767 * 
  VIC 0.032 1.427  
  QLD 0.008 0.328  
  SA -0.019 0.677  
  WA -0.050 1.622 * 
  TAS -0.026 0.589  
Notes: 
(a). The results here were estimated using a pooled 1990-1996 wage equation, a time period dummy (equal 
to one for the 1996 period) and a ‘female*1996-dummy’ interaction term.  Footnote (a) at Table 10 above 
details the other variables in the model. 
(b) Absolute t-statistics are reported; * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
At the state level there have been some interesting developments. In Western Australia, a 
state pursuing radical labour market deregulation, the gender wage gap in the full-time 
labour market grew by 5 percentage points over the 1990s. The WA results are quite 
robust. Different data sets consistently show a higher than average 1996 WA net gender 
wage gap and a growth in this gap over the first part of the 1990s (Preston and Crockett 
1999a). 29  The changing WA gap cannot be explained by changes in the relative human 
capital endowments of males and females over the period. Rather, the movement relates 
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to a change in the industry composition of males and females (with males moving into 
higher paying industries) and, more importantly, a change in the distribution of rewards 
(or labour prices) (with the change again favouring males) (Crockett and Preston 1999).  
What caused a change in the reward or wage structure in WA? 
 
It is difficult to attribute the change entirely to State legislative reforms introduced since 
1993 as the slide commenced a year earlier in November 1992 (see Figure 7 above).  
Between November 1992 and November 1993 the WA gender wage ratio widened by 3.1 
percentage points. It is also hard to argue that the WA experience was the product of 
changing economic fortunes at the time – only WA females shared in the decline. 
Relative to males nationally the earnings of WA males increased; relative to females 
nationally the earnings of WA females decreased (Preston and Crockett, 1999b).  Faced 
with a dearth of data on the coverage of payment systems by sex one can only speculate 
as to the determinants of the widening wage gap.  Available evidence tends to suggest 
that the change is more likely to be a product of institutional rather than market forces. In 
other words, there are reasons to believe that the deterioration in the gap can be linked to 
institutional arrangements for wage determination brought about by labour market 
deregulation.  For example, 1993 was an election year in WA. It was clear that the 
conservative Liberal government would win the election and embark on labour market 
reform once in power. Employers planning to negotiate an enterprise agreement had an 
incentive to postpone negotiations until new legislation offering non-union individual 
agreements was in place (December 1993).  Consistent with this hypothesis available 
statistics from the Commissioner for Workplace Agreements shows that in December 
1993 1,293 agreements were lodged for registration purposes. By comparison only 263 
agreements were lodged in January 1994 and 323 in February 1994.  
 
The decline may also reflect an over representation of females in firms opting to  
remain in the ‘run-down’ award stream.  Recent research from DEWRSB (2000) shows 
that small (employing) organisations are more likely to have award rather than agreement 





Overall the aggregate statistics suggest no change in the national gender pay gap in the 
full-time labour market, but behind the aggregate statistics differences are apparent. It is 
quite clear that changing institutional arrangements in the labour market have affected 
some groups. In Western Australia, for example, there has been a significant deterioration 
in the gender pay gap following the demise of centralised wage bargaining in 1991. 
 
For reasons noted above one might expect changes in the system of wage determination 
to have a greater impact on the earnings of part-time employees than full-timers.  
Relative to full-timers, part-timers are more likely to be in the award stream where wage 
movements have been slower and average weekly wages are lower. The following 





As with the gender wage gap the principal estimation approach uses semi-log wage 
equations for a pooled sample of males and females and a dummy variable indicating 
part-time (PT) work (defined as 10 to 35 hours per week). The independent variables 
include education, experience, marital status, children, and a control for area of residence 
(metropolitan/urban).  The results associated with this model are presented below, along 
with estimates of the raw (unadjusted) part-time/full-time (PT/FT) wage gap and a 
measure of the gender wage gap in part-time earnings.31  
 
There are a number of interesting features to the results (reported in Table 12). Firstly, at 
a national level there is a statistically significant gap in the earnings of part-timers and 
full-timers. In 1996 part-timers earn 3.8 per cent less than their full-time counterparts.  
Secondly, consistent with Whitehouse (2000), there is no significant difference in the 
earnings of males and females employed part-time in 1996.32 Thirdly, over the period 





Focusing on the changes the results show that between 1990 and 1996: 
• the adjusted earnings gap between part-time and full-time employees narrowed by 3.4 
percentage points (from –7.1 per cent to –3.8 per cent).33 
• there was a 5.4 percentage point convergence in the earning gap between females 
employed part-time and persons (males and females) employed full-time (from –9.8 
per cent to –4.4 per cent).   
• the earning gap between males employed part-time and persons employed full-time 
widened by 7.4 percentage points (from +6.3 per cent to –1.1 per cent). 
• changes in the relative earnings of males and females produced a significant 
convergence (12.6 percentage points) in the gender wage gap in the part-time labour 
market (from –15.9 per cent to –3.3 per cent).34  
 
Table 13 below sheds further light on some of these changes.  Blau and Kahn (1997), for 
the US have computed ‘quality adjusted’ measures of the changing wage structure to test 
whether the decline in the relative wages of low-skilled males was related to a change in 
their average characteristics (e.g. skill level, experience levels etc). A similar analysis is 
adopted here with separate wage equations used to compute actual, human-capital 
constant, and price-constant mean wage levels for each group in 1990 and 1996. (For 
comparison purposes full-time and part-time outcomes are reported below).   
 
The human-capital constant predicted wage level (estimated by combining the coefficient 
estimates from a 1996 wage equation with the measured characteristics (means) from the 
equivalent 1990 wage equation) shows that, for males employed full-time, their ‘quality 
adjusted’ mean wage increased by 0.140 log points between 1990 and 1996.  The 
equivalent female ‘quality adjusted’ mean wage increase was roughly the same, equal to 
0.151 log points.  In price-constant terms (calculated by combining the coefficients from 
the 1990 wage equation with the means from the 1996 wage equation), the results 
indicate that changes in the human capital endowments between 1990 and 1996 would 
have, ceteris paribus, increased the average male wage by 0.028 log points (measured at 




In the part-time labour market the trends are different. The actual wage changes show 
that amongst males the actual mean wage increased by 0.076 log points between 1990 
and 1996; the corresponding change for females was more than double, equal to 0.210 
log points.  The ‘quality-adjusted’ predicted wage shows that the lower male average 
wage growth rate in the part-time labour market can not be attributed to a decline in the 
quality of the male workforce relative to the female workforce. For both gender groups 
the actual and quality-adjusted predicted wages are identical.   
 
The ‘price-constant’(quality-changing) predicted wage confirms the above finding. 
Between 1990 and 1991 there was a very very small (insignificant) decline in the quality 
of the male workforce which, ceteris paribus would have reduced the male average part-
time wage by 0.006 log points (less than one percentage point). There was a very very 
small (insignificant) increase in the quality of the female workforce which, ceteris 
paribus, would have increased the female part-time average wage by 0.003 log points 
(less than half a percentage point). 
 
The finding of a low growth rate in male average part-time wages unrelated to changes in 
the quality of the part-time workforce suggests that other factors must have been 
important.  Potential candidates may be the rising level of casualisation within the male 
part-time workforce (see section 3), and realted to that declining levels of unionisation 
(again more pronounced amongst males).  Borland (1996), as previously noted, shows 
that declining trade union membership may be linked to rising wage inequality amongst 
men. To the extent that labour market deregulation has encouraged a shift towards part-
time (and casual) employment and fostered changing institutional arrangements in the 
labour market (eg. union membership), then one could conclude from the above that the 
impact of these policies has varied across different labour market groups with male part-




Table 12: Estimated Part-Time/Full-Time Hourly Wage Gaps, Australia. 
  1996 1990 Change 1990 to 1996 
Raw PT/FT Adjusted PT/FT Raw PT/FT Adjusted PT/FT Raw PT/FT Adjusted PT/FT 
 Wage Gap Wage Gap Wage Gap Wage Gap Wage Gap Wage Gap 
  Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  
All persons -0.078 7.410 *** -0.038 3.794 *** -0.088 8.303 *** -0.071 7.198 *** -0.009 -0.621 -0.034 -2.403 **
Male-PT to 
Persons-FT -0.126 4.810 *** -0.011 0.460 -0.025 0.764 0.063 2.122 ** 0.101 2.429 ** 0.074 1.928 *
Fem-PT to  
Persons-FT -0.061 5.520 *** -0.044 4.303 *** -0.098 9.143 *** -0.098 9.695 *** -0.037 -2.403 ** -0.054 -3.756 ***
Gender 
Wage Gap in 
PT pay 0.060 2.160 ** -0.033 1.289 -0.074 2.200 ** -0.159 5.153 *** -0.134 -3.071 *** -0.126 -3.130 ***




Table 13: Actual and Predicted Log Wages 
 1990 1996 Change 1990-96 
 
Males: Employed Full-Time    
 Actual Wage 2.494 2.667 0.173 
 Predicted Wage (1990 means) 2.494 2.634 0.140 
 Predicted Wage (1990 prices) 2.494 2.522 0.028 
Females: Employed Full-Time    
 Actual Wage 2.349 2.540 0.191 
 Predicted Wage (1990 means) 2.349 2.500 0.151 
 Predicted Wage (1990 prices) 2.349 2.379 0.030 
Males: Employed Part-Time    
 Actual Wage 2.420 2.496 0.076 
 Predicted Wage (1990 means) 2.420 2.496 0.076 
 Predicted Wage (1990 prices) 2.420 2.414 -0.006 
Females: Employed Part-Time    
 Actual Wage 2.346 2.556 0.210 
 Predicted Wage (1990 means) 2.346 2.557 0.211 




5: Summary and Conclusion 
 
Over the last few decades governments of most Western developed economies have 
pursued policies designed to deregulate the labour market and decentralise pay 
negotiations.  Relative to many other nations Australia has been slow to embrace the neo-
liberalist agenda, although since the 1990s the pace of reform has quickened. Australia is 
now considered a ‘radical example of direct labour market deregulation’ (Campbell and 
Brosnan 1999).  
 
Within Australia it was widely feared that labour market deregulation would 
disadvantage women, particularly those in low status, low paid, low unionised, part-time 
jobs, and thus in possession of little bargaining power (Wooden, 1997).  Using unit 
record data from two income surveys - one pre (1990) and one post (1996) deregulation - 
this paper examines the claim that labour market deregulation has a differential impact on 
different labour market groups.  Two key indicators are used in the analysis: the gender 
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wage gap and the wage gap between full-time and part-time workers.  The key findings 
may be summarised as follows.   
 
During a period of radical labour market deregulation (1990 to 1996) there has been:  
 
• no change in the national gender wage gap in the full-time labour market.  The 
quality-adjusted gap remains stable at 10.5 per cent. 
 
• a significant deterioration in the gender pay gap within the full-time labour market in 
Western Australia; the adjusted gap is now around 18.5 per cent. 
 
• a significant convergence (by 3.4 percentage points to 3.8 per cent) in the overall 
part-time/full-time wage gap.  
 
• a 5.4 percentage point convergence (to –4.4 per cent) in the wage gap of females 
employed part-time and persons (males and females) employed full-time.  
 
• a 7.4 percentage point deterioration (to –1.1 per cent) in the wage gap of males 
employed part-time and persons employed full-time. 
 
• an 80 per cent (or 12.6 percentage point) convergence in the gender pay gap in the 
part-time labour market.  By 1996 females employed part-time earned 3.3 per cent 
less than their male counterparts employed part-time.   
 
The convergence in the gender pay gap in the part-time labour market is unrelated to 
changes in the quality of the part-time workforce and has more to do with male treatment 
disadvantage, possibly caused by growing levels of casualisation and declining union 
membership levels – both of which can be linked to labour market deregulation. 
 
In conclusion, although evidence shows some stability in the gender pay gap in full-time 
labour markets, the outcome reflects the impact of on-going equal opportunity policies 
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such as training, promotion and career development. In so far as deregulation has had an 
impact it has prevented further convergence in the gender pay gap in the full-time labour 
market.   
 
In the part-time labour market deregulation has contributed to a growth in low paid, low 
status jobs and, importantly, a deterioration in the relative earnings of males employed 
part-time. From a policy perspective a growth in this gap will make it increasingly 
difficult to move to a more balanced allocation of paid work time between men and 
women and, ultimately, place additional constraints on the capacity for females to attain 
labour market equality (Rubery, Smith and Fagan, 1998). 
 
As a final comment, the results shown here do not refute the hypothesis that labour 
market deregulation adversely impacts on the earnings of females employed in part-time, 
low paid, low status jobs. The findings in this paper are based on comparisons of average 
wages for different groups. The part-time workforce is not, however, homogeneous. 
Females employed part-time differ with respect to skills, aims, preferences etc. (Walsh 
1999). Many females employed part-time work in a professional capacity (e.g nursing). 
Many female part-time employees are similarly employed in low-skilled jobs (e.g. 
cleaning). Accordingly, to further understand how labour market deregulation is 
impacting on the labour market future work in this field should study the wage outcomes 










Table I: Estimated wage equations, Australia, 1996 and 1990 
  1996 1990 
 Coef. Absolute t. mean Coef. Absolute t. mean
Constant 2.138 148.443 2.021 178.606 
Skillvoc 0.152 16.483 0.321 0.162 22.610 0.396
Degree 0.415 35.072 0.174 0.408 35.829 0.131
Potential experience 0.035 23.162 18.577 0.030 23.980 16.509
Potential experience2/100 -0.069 19.253 4.746 -0.059 20.799 4.085
Married 0.093 8.343 0.638 0.102 10.158 0.640
Wsd 0.081 4.676 0.076 0.063 3.951 0.068
Kids0t4 -0.010 0.747 0.140 0.011 1.042 0.147
Kids5t9 -0.010 0.759 0.146 -0.015 1.408 0.151
Kid1015 -0.043 3.471 0.165 -0.042 4.059 0.166
Migrant -0.050 4.876 0.251 -0.033 4.114 0.260
Metro 0.060 6.486 0.704 0.067 8.585 0.686
Female -0.105 12.549 0.353 -0.113 15.580 0.339
   
R2adj. 0.243 0.288  
Breusch-Pagan 326 236  
Sample Size 9068 9658  
Mean Dependent Variable 
(hourly wage) 2.628 2.445  
Note: The samples are comprised of adult (16 to 64) males and females who are employed full-time (35+ 
hours per week) and have only one job.  Absolute t-statistics are reported. Variable labels and definitions 
are given in Appendix C. 
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Appendix B: Variable Definition 
 
Dependent Variable 
Natural logarithm of hourly earnings. In the 1996 data set the variable was derived via 
continuous earnings and hours information. In the 1990 data set the earnings information 
was provided on a continuous basis, but the hours were grouped as follows:  
 
1 “0 to 9 hours per week”; 2 “10 to 19 hours per week”; 3 “20 to 24 hours per 
week”; 4 “24 to 29 hours per week”; 5 “30 to 34 hours per week”; 6 “35 to 39 
hours per week”; 7 “40 to 44 hours per week”; 8 “45 to 49 hours per week”; 9 “50 
hours per week or more”.  
 
The mid points of each category were used to construct a continuous measure. In the case 
of the open-ended upper limit the variable was set at 55 hours. 
  
Education Level 
Highest qualification: the omitted or reference category includes persons with a basic 
qualification, persons who completed secondary schooling, and persons who did not 
complete school. 
 
Skillvoc: Highest qualification a skilled certificate or diploma.  
Degree: Highest qualification a bachelor degree or higher. 
 
Labour Market Experience  
Potential Experience: equal to ‘(age of person)-(years of schooling)-5’.   
 
Years of schooling was defined as follows: 16.5 for those with a degree or higher; 15 for 
those with a skilled vocational qualification (e.g. trade or diploma), 13 for persons 
completing high school or post-school basic qualifications; and 11 for those with no 
qualifications. 
 
Age of person – this information was provided in bands. 
 
1996 1990 
15 through 24: continuous 15 through 17: continuous 
25-29 years 18-20 years 
30-34 years 21-24 years 
35-39 years 25-29 years 
40-44 years 30-34 years 
45-49 years 35-39 years 
50-54 years 40-44 years 
55 through 64: continuous 45-49 years 
 50-54 years 
 55-59 years 




Marital Status  
Persons who were single formed the omitted category 
Married: married 
Wsd: widowed, separated or divorced. 
 
Children 
Persons with no dependent children formed the omitted category. 
Kids0t4: has dependent children aged between 0 and 4. 
Kids5t9:  has dependent children aged between 5 and 9 
Kid1015: has dependent children aged between 10 and 15 
 
Birthplace  
Migrant: equal to 1 if the person was born overseas. Australians form the reference group. 
 
Geographic location  
Metro: equal to 1 if the person resides in a capital city. 
 
Gender  






In the economic literature studies of the gender pay gap a variety of 
decomposition techniques are frequently employed to study sources of wage 
inequality. The Blinder (1973), Oaxaca (1973) and Wellington (1993) techniques 
are amongst the more common. The Blinder/Oaxaca approach provides a one 
period decomposition. The Wellington approach extends this across two periods. 
The following summarises the two techniques. 
 
Blinder/Oaxaca 
Firstly two separate wage equations of the form ln   Y Vim m im m= +β β0  and 
ln   Y Vif f if f= +β β0  are estimated for males (m) and females (f), respectively.  
Adopting the male wage structure as the non-discriminatory norm the raw wage 
gap can be decomposed using the following procedure: 35 
 
ln ln ( )  (   ) (   )Y Y V V Vm f m f m f m f m f− = − + − + −β β β β β0 0     
 
where m denotes the males, f denotes females, V is a vector of the means of the 
independent variables and β  is a vector of estimated slope coefficients.  The first 
term of the decomposition calculates the portion of the gap attributable to 
differences in the characteristics of males and females.  The residual measures 
the unexplained gender wage differential and is often regarded as a measure of 




The Wellington (1993) technique may be summarised as follows: 
 











where Yln   is the mean wage, V is a vector of the means of the independent 
variables β  is a vector of estimated slope coefficients, m and f denote males and 
females respectively, and the subscripts 96 and 91 refer to two different time 
periods, in this case 1996 and 1991.  The first term on the right hand side 
measures the explained change in the gender wage gap. The second term 





Preston and Crockett (1999a) – reconciling the differences 
 
Preston and Crockett use the Wellington approach to decompose various 
Australian wage gaps in to two components: (a) changes attributable to changes 
in the characteristics of males and females (explained), and; (b) an unexplained 
component measuring a change in the treatment of females in the labour market. 
Table II replicates Preston and Crockett’s results. 
  
Table II: 1991 to 1996 Changing Gender Earning Gaps 
  NSW VIC QLD ADEL PERTH
Change Gender Gap to 
Explain 
-1.288 0.176 0.056 -2.808 1.113
Explained Portion  -0.661 -1.688 0.148 -2.599 -0.099
Unexplained Portion -0.627 1.864 -0.092 -0.209 1.212
Source: Table 3, Preston and Crockett, 1999. 
 
When compared to Table 10 in the body of the above paper there are some 
notable differences. The estimates in Preston and Crockett are much lower and 
the Victorian results are contradictory.  Differences in dependent variables, 
estimation technique, model specification and time periods studied may account 
for some of these differences. 
 
Nature of the dependent variable:  The dependent variable in Preston and 
Crockett measures weekly earnings from all sources with the responses grouped 
into bands. The mid points of each bands were used to construct a continuous 
measure of income.  The open-ended upper limit was given a value of 1.5 times 
the lower threshold level.  Dividing annual income by 52 derived weekly earnings.  
The estimates in Table 10 in the body of the text are derived from models 
measuring hourly earnings. In the 1995/96 and 1996/97 income distribution 
surveys information on Total current usual weekly income from wages or salary 
from main and second jobs (IWSUCP) and number of hours usually worked per 
week in main and second jobs (HRSWKACP) were provided on a continuous 
basis.  In the 1990 IDS information on income was continuous basis, but the 
hours information was grouped (see Appendix B). The mid-points of each band 
were used to generate a continuous measure of hours. Persons holding more 
than one job were excluded from the sample and a measure of hourly pay by 
dividing income by hours. 
 
Table III shows that even within the same data set and sample, the size of the 
estimated gender wage gap varies depending on whether weekly or hourly 
earnings are used. By way of example, when the dependent variable is weekly 
earnings the estimated Australian net gender wage gap is 13.2 per cent; 2.7 
percentage points higher than the estimated net gender hourly wage gap (as 
reported in Table 10).  The difference is not statistically significant (t=0.210).  The 
models are almost similar, the only difference being the inclusion of a dummy 
variable measuring long hours (40+ per week) in the weekly wage regression.  
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Table III: Comparisons of estimated gender wage gaps 1996 and 1990 
 







 Raw  Adjusted Raw Adjusted Raw Adjusted
Australia 0.192 -0.141 0.181 -0.132 0.127 -0.105
NSW 0.183 -0.133 0.160 -0.122 0.105 -0.097
VIC 0.176 -0.135 0.161 -0.118 0.109 -0.088
QLD 0.214 -0.151 0.182 -0.138 0.135 -0.112
SA 0.172 -0.159 0.12 -0.076 0.066 -0.051
WA 0.261 0.176 0.305 -0.210 0.237 -0.185
TAS 0.178 -0.171 0.181 -0.142 0.139 -0.117
   
 1991 Census(c) 1990 IDS(d) 1990 IDS(d) 
 Raw Adjusted Raw Adjusted Raw Adjusted
Australia 0.199 0.145 0.203 0.142 0.146 0.108
Notes: 
(a) These estimates were generated from a set of regressions where the dependent variable was weekly earnings 
(from all sources) and the independent variables controlled for education level (4 dummies), experience and its 
square, marital status (2 dummies), children (1 dummy), birthplace (2 dummies), sector of employment 
(public/private dummy), location (rural/urban dummy), industry (1 digit) and occupation (1 digit). The 
Blinder/Oaxaca decomposition  procedure was applied. The results are reported in Preston and Crockett 
(1999b), Table 2. 
(b) The set of independent variables in these models controlled for education level (2 dummies), experience and its 
square, marital status (2 dummies), children (3 dummies), birthplace (1 dummy) and location (1 dummy). There 
were no controls for industry and occupation. Gender disadvantage is estimated using the simple dummy 
variable approach. 
(c) This estimate is contained in Preston 1997, where industry and occupation are controlled for at the mainly 2digit 
level of analysis. The other independent variables are equivalent to those listed at (a) above.  The 
Blinder/Oaxaca decomposition approach was used here. 
(d) These weekly and hourly income estimates are based on the 1990 IDS file and calculated using the 
Blinder/Oaxaca technique. The models used were of a basic specification without controls for industry and 
occupation. The 1990 estimates are consistent with comparable estimates in the literature. Langford (1995), for 
example, finds a raw gap of 0.150 and an a Blinder/Oaxaca adjusted gap of 0.092. Langford controls for one 
digit industry and occupation. 
 
 
Estimation Technique: In Table 11 in the text the estimates are generated from a 
pooled 1990 and 1996 wage equation. A “female*1996-dummy” interaction term 
is used to measure gender differences in the changing wage gap over the period 
1990 to 1996. In this approach the means associated with the various 1990 and 
1996 productivity characteristics are constrained to be equal. The Wellington 
decomposition procedure used to generate the Preston and Crockett (1999a) 
results allows for changes in the endowments or productivity characteristics of 
males and females over the period.  Table IV below allows comparisons of the 
changing gender wage gap estimated using the Wellington decomposition 
procedure.  The last column of Table IV may be compared to the results in Table 
10 above. Some differences are apparent. Using the dummy variable approach 
the WA net gender hourly wage gap widens by 5 percentage points (Table 11). 
Using the Wellington approach it widens by 4.2 percentage points (Table IV). 
Using weekly income as the dependent variable the corresponding change is 3.5 




Differences in model specification: The analysis in Table IV also shows that the 
results are sensitive to model specification. Differences in the industry and 
occupational distribution of males and females are shown to account for some of 
the gender wage gap. Thus, inclusion of industry and occupation variables in the 
wage equation results in lower estimated gender wage gaps vis a vis a basic 
specification of the model. For example, using the Wellington decomposition 
approach, 1990 and 1996 income distribution surveys and hourly earnings as the 
dependent variable the results in Table IV show that between 1990 and 1996 the 
net gender wage gap narrowed by 4.2 percentage points in Western Australia. 
When industry and occupation are controlled for the revised change in the WA 
net gender wage gap is 2.9 percentage points.  Preston and Crockett (1999a) 
controlled for one digit industry and occupation in their models. The results 
reported in Tables 10 and 11 above are void of industry and occupation controls. 
 
Table IV: 
Sensitivity Analysis Of Estimated Gender Wage Gaps For Adults Employed Full-
Time. A Study Of The Wellington Decomposition Technique Across Different 





1990 to 1996, Income Distribution Surveys 
 Weekly Earnings 
(all sources) 
Weekly Earnings Hourly Earnings 





















Australia -0.42 0.20 -2.3 -2.3 -2.0 -1.9 -1.5 -1.1
NSW -1.29 -0.63 -5.2 -6.7 -5.4 -5.5 -6.2 -4.6
VIC 0.18 1.86 -5.0 -4.0 -4.4 -4.0 -2.4 -3.2
WA(a) 1.11 1.21 4.3 2.2 3.5 4.2 2.9 4.2
Notes: 
(a) In the  Census based analysis it was not possible to separately identify persons residing in 
Western Australia in 1991. The analysis reported here measures the changing Perth wage gap. 
(Perth is the capital of Western Australia). 
(b) The ‘extended model’ is the basic (human capital + demographics) model plus controls for 
one digit industry and occupation. See note (b) to Table iii for a list of the variables in the basic 
model. 
( c) The Wellington decomposition approach requires estimation of separate male and female 
wage equations for each period (i.e. 4 sets of results). The following table sets out the different 
sample sizes. It is possible that the results are sensitive to sample size, particularly at smaller 
levels. It is for this reason that the analysis presented in the body of this paper opts for the simple 
dummy variable approach rather than the more sophisticated Blinder/Oaxaca (1993) and 
Wellington (1993) type decompositions.   
 Sample Sizes: 
 Australia NSW VIC WA  Australia NSW VIC WA
1996:Males 5866 1497 1366 873 1990:Males 6385 1652 1369 983
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1  Bell and Ritchie (1998) similarly find a mixed set of outcomes behind the aggregate statistics, 
although in their article they highlight differences in sector (public/private) wage relativities, coverage of 
collective agreements and time effects (with females having flatter age-earning profiles). 
2  The discussion in this section is draws extensively from Campbell and Brosnan (1999) 
3  In an analogous way Dawkins and Norris (1995) show that between 1978 and 1993 there was a 
7.9 percentage point increase in the incidence of part-time employment in both the UK and Australia, 
notwithstanding the very different industrial relations backgrounds prevailing at the time. The Australian 
growth was primarily demand driven with an important factor being the lower relative labour costs 
associated with part-timers. 
4  For further information on the State reforms see, also: Alexander and Lewer  (1998); Gardner and 
Palmer (1997) and Preston and Crockett (1999b). 
5  The estimated size of the unregulated, individual contract, sector (i.e. 14 per cent) is significantly 
lower than estimates elsewhere.  Buchannan et al. (1999), for example, suggest that around 30 per cent of 
the workforce are outside the system. Their estimates are based on 1995 AWIRS data and, although dated, 
would appear more plausible.  Firstly, for most of the period of award regulation 20 per cent of the 
workforce were outside the system. Secondly, since 1991 there has been a growth in the coverage of 
individual and common law contracts.  The difference in the size of the estimates may relate to the nature 
of the sampling framework in the DEWRSB survey. Firms with less than 5 employees were excluded from 
the survey.  
6  In the UK the share of part-time jobs occupied by females appears to be higher. Estimates range 
from 79 per cent (Fajertag, 1999) to 82 per cent (Bruegel and Perrons, 1998). The higher share may, of 
course, related in part to differences in the definition of part-time work. In Australia part-time work is 
defined as less than 35 hours per week. 
7   The following table may help clarify the changing employment shares discussed here.  
 Share of Total Employment (%) Share of Group Employment (%) 
 Jun-90 Jun-96 Jun-00 Jun-90 Jun-96 Jun-00 
Males 
 FT 53.9 50.5 49.2 92.1 88.7 87.7 
 PT 4.6 6.4 6.9 7.9 11.3 12.3 
Females       
 FT 25.0 24.7 24.9 60.3 57.4 56.7 
 PT 16.5 18.4 19.0 39.7 42.6 43.3 
Source: ABS Cat. 6203 
8  The Australian Bureau of Statistics defines casuals as employees who are “not entitled to either 
annual leave or sick leave in their main job”. Although casual contracts may be terminated often at an hours 
notice a feature of many casual jobs is that they are on-going. The growth in the demand for casual labour 
essentially reflects the fact that the labour costs associated with casual employees are comparatively low 
(Dawkins and Norris, 1990). 
9  The proportions show in Figures 5 and 6 are calculated as a share of persons working one or more 
hours in the reference period. Persons who are classified as employed, but who worked zero hours in the 
reference period (e.g. because of holidays, sick leave etc.) were excluded from the calculation. 
10  Some caution should be exercised in interpreting these figures as the information reflects hours 
actually worked (rather than paid) in the reference period. For example, persons who usually work full-time 
(defined in Australia as 35 or more hours per week), but who were on holiday or had flex-leave, would 
record < 35 hours in the reference period. 
11  These estimates are based on measures of Average Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings, Full-Time 
Adults and have been calculated using a four quarter moving average.  
12  It should be noted that retrenchments in the public sector have been more concentrated in lower-
paid positions. Accordingly, without controlling for differences in the skill levels across sectors the raw 
wage gaps shown here are probably over-stated. 
13  The survey only sampled firms with 5 or more employees.  The coverage of enterprise agreements 
is lower in small firms than large, which would suggest that, for the private sector, the actual portion of the 
workforce covered by enterprise agreements is actually lower than 29 per cent. 
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14  See Table 1 above. 
15 In Gornick and Jacobs (1996) the focus is on wage data from 1986. 
16  In the 1996/97 data set the earnings of persons employed full-time were deflated by a factor of 4.8 
(with 4.8 representing the average movement in full-time earnings between 1995/96 and 1996/97). Part-
time earnings were deflated by 0.2 per cent. 
17  Full-timers are defined as those working 35 or more hours per week in their main job. The 
rationale for initially restricting the sample to full-time wage and salary earners is that it overcomes some 
of the estimation difficulties associated with measuring the labour market experience of persons employed 
part-time.   
18  Persons identified as being employed in defence were excluded from the analysis, as were persons 
with more than one job.  
19  For short-hand purposes 1996 is used to refer to the merged 1995/96 and 1996/97 data set. 1990 
refers to the 1989/90 data set. 
20  Gornick and Jacobs (1996) find that persons working fewer than tend hours tend to understate 
their hours worked, thus inflating the estimated hourly wage.  Removing persons working less than 10 
hours a week eliminated 7.1 per cent of females and 1.5 per cent of males from the combined 1990-1996 
sample. 
21  Hourly earnings are calculated as total weekly earnings from main job divided by hours of work in 
main job.  In the 1996 data set the hours information is given on a continuous basis. In the 1990 data set the 
hours information are grouped. The mid points of the categories are thus used to construct hourly earnings.   
22  It is generally acknowledged that ‘potential experience’ (calculated as age minus years of 
schooling minus 5) is a poor proxy for female labour market experience. Rummery (1992) shows that when 
actual measures of experience are used the rate of return is lower. In Rummery's case it fell from 1.48 per 
cent using potential to 1.32 per cent using actual.  A number of different techniques may be employed to try 
to overcome the data limitations.  Some studies employ the potential measure (as used here) but augment 
the regression equation with additional variables to control for marital status and children to correct for 
spells of absence from the workforce (see, for example, Gregory and Daly, 1992).  Others have adjusted the 
potential measure to account for intermittent experience patterns (e.g. Lambert, 1993), or have imputed 
actual measures of experience from other equations (e.g. Miller and Volker, 1993).  The results using these 
alternative approaches are mixed. On the one hand, Wright and Ermisch's (1991) results for the UK show 
that the potential measure overstates the returns to experience for women. On the other hand Kidd and 
Shannon (1996) find that the imputed measure suggests higher returns.  According to Blinder (1976), in the 
absence of data on actual work experience, any measure of experience will be plagued by statistical biases. 
The simple 'potential' measure is thus an accepted approach. The approach adopted in this paper follows 
Gregory and Daly (1992) and controls for related demographic characteristics such as marital status and 
dependant children. Langford (1995) shows that this approach yields fairly accurate results. 
23  The analysis was run with and without industry and occupation controls. Tests of significance 
revealed no significant difference on the estimated size of the female dummy coefficient (used to proxy 
gender wage discrimination). The results reported here pertain to a basic (human capital) specification of 
the wage equation without the industry and occupation augmentations. 
24  Further description of the explanatory variables is provided in the Appendix B. 
25  It should be note that while it is common to interpret the gap as evidence that female skills and 
qualifications are undervalued the interpretation does have some limitations. For example, the model is 
unable to control for unmeasured differences in male and female characteristics. These unmeasured 
differences may account for a portion of the gender wage gap. 
26  In semi-logarithmic equations the coefficients of dummy variables that are small in value may be 
interpreted as the percentage effects on the dependent variable, relative to the omitted category (Halvorsen 
1980). 
27     Using the Blinder/Oaxaca decomposition approach the adjusted national 1996 gender wage gap is 
10 per cent without industry and occupation controls, and 9.3 per cent with industry and occupation 
controls. The corresponding estimates for 1990 are 10.8 and 10.3 per cent, respectively. These results are 
consistent with those estimated elsewhere. Langford (1995), for example, using the same 1990 data set, 
similar sample and similar specification (with industry and occupation) estimates an adjusted gender wage 




                                                                                                                                                 
28  Analysis of the descriptive statistics from the unit recorded data used in this section reveals that 
between 1990 and 1996 the share of females, employed full-time, who had a degree increased from 13 per 
cent to 20.5 per cent.  
29    In trend terms these results are fairly consistent with estimates in Preston and Crockett 
(1999a) using 1991 and 1996 Australian Census data. There are, however, two notable 
differences. Firstly the estimated changes in the Preston and Crockett study are much smaller.  
Preston and Crockett, for example, report a 0.6 percentage point convergence in the NSW net 
gender wage  gap. The corresponding estimate in Table 11 suggest a 3.7 percentage point 
convergence.  Secondly, as noted above, Preston and Crockett found that the net gender wage 
gap of Perth (Western Australia) and Victoria widened between 1991 and 1996. In Perth it grew 
by 1.2 percentage points and in Victoria it grew by 1.8 percentage points. The Victorian results 
are at odds with the results reported in Table 11 (showing an insignificant decline in the gap).  
What might account for the differences? Firstly, it may be that the Victorian change was not 
significant. Relative to the recorded change in NSW the Victorian change was significant at the 10 
per cent level. However, relative to fluctuations in the within state (Victoria) wage gap this change 
may not have been significant. Preston and Crocket did not examine this.  An insignificant finding 
would not be at odds with the hypothesis since, as noted earlier, the Victorian reforms may have 
been tempered by the collectivist arrangements at the federal level.  (Appendix C explores other 
possible explanations for the divergent Preston and Crockett results and those detailed here).   
30  Preliminary research suggests that this is a plausible hypothesis, although no firm evidence is yet 
available. 
31  These estimates were obtained from the coefficients on a “female*part-time” interaction term 
(FPT). Thus the equation was of the form   iiiii uVFPTPTY ++++= ββββ 210ln   where, as 
before, V is a vector of characteristics.  The coefficient on the PT variable measure the earnings of 
males employed PT vis a vis  persons employed full-time. Female workers employed part-time earn  
21 ββ +  .  The t-statistics on 2β  indicate whether the earnings of females working part-time are 
significantly different from males employed part-time. 
32  Estimates in Whitehouse (2000), summarised in Table 9 above show a gender wage gap in part-
time earnings of two percentage points in 1990. Over the period 1990-98 the gap converged three 
percentage points; by 1998 males had an earnings disadvantage of one percentage point. 
33  Estimates of the raw or unadjusted part-time (casual & permanent)/full-time (permanent) wage 
gap using unpublished data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics shows that the gap widened by 9 
percentage points (from –6 per cent to –15 per cent) between 1990 and 1998 (Whitehouse, 2000; see Table 
9 above). The calculated change is considerably higher than the estimated changes in Table 12. There it is 
shown that the raw PT/FT wage gap was equal to –8.8 per cent in 1990 and –7.8 per cent in 1996. It is 
difficult to know why the differences are so large. It may relate to differences in sample groups. In the 
study above persons working fewer than 10 hours and persons with more than one job are excluded from 
the analysis. This may place upward bias on the wages of the part-time workers.  The big change observed 
in Whitehouse may also relate to time period studied. For example, any changes emanating from the federal 
Workplace Agreements Act 1996 will not show up in the sample data in this paper, but may be present in 
the Whitehouse estimates. 
34  Bruegel and Perrons (1998) similarly note that in the UK the position of low paid women relative 
to low paid men has only improved because of a deterioration in the relative position of low paid men. 
35  If the female wage structure is taken as the non-discriminatory norm the explained 
portion is  equal to ( ) V Vm f f− β , and the unexplained portion is equal to Vm m f(   )β β− . 
